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THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
AND THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
INTRODUCTION
On May 24, 1979, the Governor of New York proposed a bill designed to
restructure the classification of misdemeanors in New York.' This plan
requires that defendants accused of any of four misdemeanors in New York
City-petit larceny, 2 theft of services, 3 criminal possession of stolen prop-
erty,4 and criminal mischief--shall be tried summarily by a judge in the
Criminal Court 6 when the maximum value of the property stolen or destroyed
does not exceed $150.2 Presently, all persons accused of these crimes in New
York State are entitled to trial by jury. The bill, however, calls for the
creation of four new "lesser included offenses"8 for each of these crimes to be
included in a new "B" class of misdemeanors. 9 The rationale of the proposed
1. N.Y.S. 6389, N.Y.A. 8183, 202d Sess. (1979) Governor's Program Bill, An Act to Amend
the Penal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, in Relation to the Reclassification of Certain
Misdemeanors [hereinafter cited as Governor's Bill]; see Governor's Memorandum, Re: An Act to
Amend the Penal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, in Relation to the Reclassification of
Certain Misdemeanors (1979) [hereinafter cited as Governor's Memorandum).
2. "A person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals property." N.Y. Penal Law § 155.25
(McKinney 1975).
3. The Penal Law provides that a person is guilty of theft of services when he knowingly uses
or attempts to use a stolen credit card to obtain services, and, when he attempts to use another's
labor or facilities for his own benefit. It also specifically proscribes various actions such as theft of
restaurant, hotel, railroad, subway, taxi, gas, electric, and telephone services. N.Y. Penal Law §
165.15 (IMcKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979-1980).
4. "A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree when he
knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an
owner thereof or to impede recovery by an owner thereof." N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 (McKinney
1975).
5. "A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when, having no right to do so
nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he: 1. Intentionally damages
property of another person; or 2. Recklessly damages property of another person in an amount
exceeding two hundred fifty dollars." N.Y. Penal Law § 145.00 (McKinney 1975).
6. The Criminal Procedure Law presently provides that "in the New York city criminal court
the trial of ... a misdemeanor for which the authorized term of imprisonment is not more than
six months must be a single judge trial." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 340.40(2) McKinney 1971).
7. Governor's Bill, supra note 1, §§ 10-17; see Governor's Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1-2.
The four new misdemeanors will be designated petit larceny in the second degree, theft of
services in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and
criminal mischief in the fifth degree. Id.
8. The phrase "lesser included offense" is commonly used in criminal law to denominate any
crime "composed of some, but not all, of the elements of a greater crime, and which does not
have any element not included in the greater offense." State v. Stewart, 292 So. 2d 677, 679 (La.
1974) (citation omitted); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(37) (McKinney 1971). See also Black's Law
Dictionary 812 (5th ed. 1979).
9. In the New York Penal Law, misdemeanors are presently classified into three classes. "A".
"B" and "Unclassified." N.Y. Penal Law § 55.05(2) (McKinney 1975). Under the proposed
legislation, the present "B" class will be unchanged, except that it will be renamed "C".
Governor's Bill, supra note 1, § 1. The four new misdemeanors will make up the new class "B".
with a maximum prison sentence of six months. Id., § 4. Class "A" will change only to the extent
that the new class "B" crimes will be removed from the present definition of the class "A" crime,
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legislation is that the creation of new "lesser included offenses," punishable by
no more than six months in prison, ' 0 permits the state to deny the right to
trial by jury to those persons charged with these four misdemeanors. I
Throughout history, legislatures have grappled with the question of
whether particular crimes should be tried by a jury or a judge.12 Unfortu-
nately, this choice is often influenced by recognition of the burden on
chronically backlogged and ill-funded criminal justice systems caused by
expensive and time-consuming jury trials. 13 The proposed legislation, how-
ever, raises the novel issue of whether a state can attempt to alleviate this
serious congestion by basing the right to a jury trial on a mere adjustment of
the penalties authorized for particular crimes.
This Note contends that the proposed legislation is unconstitutional. The
history of the legislative prerogative to try crimes summarily is discussed in
Part I, which includes an examination of the policy considerations that affect
any decision to deny a jury trial. In Part II the constitutional limitations on
this prerogative are analyzed, as well as the current status of the petty offense
doctrine formulated by the Supreme Court. Finally, the petty offense formula
is applied in Part III to the four misdemeanors selected for reclassification.
The Note concludes that the right to a jury trial cannot be removed from
these crimes by merely lowering the maximum property value and reducing
the maximum penalty.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE DECISION
A. History
In the twelfth century, trial by jury in criminal cases was a fundamental
right at English common law.14 Parliament initially guaranteed this right to
of petit larceny, theft of services, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and
criminal mischief in the fourth degree.
10. The reduction in the property value ceiling is the apparent justification for the lenient
prison sentence of six months rather than one year. These four misdemeanors are "relatively
minor, non-violent offenses for which a lengthy period of imprisonment is not warranted."
Governor's Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2.
11. "[Tlhe United States Supreme Court has held that a jury trial is not constitutionally
mandated for an offense punishable by no more than six months in jail." Id. (citation omitted).
Although the Governor cites the case of Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), for this
proposition, a careful reading of that case leads to the somewhat different conclusion that
notwithstanding the nature of the offense, a prison term in excess of six months necessitates that
the defendant be tried by a jury. See notes 94-104 infra and accompanying text. The Baldwin
decision was a plurality opinion, with two justices concurring, two justices concurring in the
judgment, and three dissenting.
12. A second historic issue is the degree of penalty that should be prescribed for a particular
crime. Penalties are generally established in accordance with one of the following theories of
punishment: (1) prevention, (2) restraint, (3) rehabilitation, (4) deterrence, (5) education, and (6)
retribution. See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-62 (1965); Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-52 (1949); J. Hall, General Prinziples of Criminal Law 296-324 (2d ed.
1960); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, 21-24 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 217-18, 247 N.E.2d 260, 265, 299
N.Y.S.2d 424, 431-32 (1969), rev'd sub nom. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). This
rationalization was criticized, however, by Judge Burke in his dissent. Id. at 231-32, 247 N.E.2d
at 274, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (Burke, J., dissenting).
14. For a comprehensive review of the history of trial by jury in criminal cases, see P. Devlin,
[Vol. 48
1979] PETTY OFFENSES
all criminal defendants. 15 By the sixteenth century, however, Parliament had
passed so many penal statutes that the consequent high volume of criminal
prosecutions burdened England's criminal courts and threatened the effective
administration of justice. 16 To relieve the congestion, Parliament created a
class of minor offenses to be tried without a jury. 17 Eventually, this class
grew to include more serious offenses to the extent that ninety-five percent of
all criminal cases in England are now dealt with summarily.1 8
In America, the colonists condemned England's infringements of the right
to a jury trial in the Declaration of Independence,"9 yet, all of the colonies
resorted to the summary disposition of some crimes. None of the colonies,
however, denied the right to a jury trial to the extent that prevailed in
England at that time.20 An examination of the colonial laws of New York
indicates that the legislature decided as early as 1732 to expedite criminal
cases and reduce court costs by providing for the summary disposition of a
variety of minor offenses.2 1 New York State has often attempted to ease the
stress on its criminal courts by providing for summary disposition of some




The special consideration given to the criminal courts in New York City
has always involved the balancing of the practical reality of court congestion
Trial by Jury (1956); W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury (1875); 1 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 298-350 (1922).
15. Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial
by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 923 (1926).
16. Id. at 924-27.
17. Id. at 922-34.
18. M. Gleisser, Juries and Justice 46 (1968); see L. Moore, The Jury, Tool of Kings.
Palladium of Liberty 125-42 (1973).
19. Among the grievances set forth by the colonists in the Declaration of Independence was
that the King was "depriving us in many cases of the benefits of Trial by Jury." The Declaration
of Independence. It is clear that the right to trial by jury was greatly cherished by the English
colonists. The Federalist No. 83 (A. Hamilton) 557-60 (Ford ed. 1898).
20. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 934-68.
21. Id. at 944-49, 983-88; see, e.g., Law of Oct. 14, 1732, ch. 590, 1720-1737 N.Y.
Colonial Laws 766-68 (expired 1735), revived, Law of Nov. 10, 1736, ch. 635, 1720-1737
N.Y. Colonial Laws 920 (expired 1744). In fact, two of the crimes that the Governor proposes to
treat summarily, petit larceny and malicious mischief, were tried without juries in colonial New
York. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 983, 986-87. As will be demonstrated in Part U,
infra, however, the colonial practice in New York does not define the constitutional right to trial
by jury enjoyed by a criminal defendant today. Rather, the history of this right "is illumined by
specific instances and not definitively limited by them. It belittles the Constitution to crystallize it
by the caprice of some statute which expressed the limit of punishment meted out in 1789 through
summary procedure." Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 981.
22. The New York Penal Law of 1909 contained a provision for bench trials specially in the
Criminal Courts of New York City. The provision remained in New York's penal code until the
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Inferior
Criminal Courts Act of the City of New York, ch. 659, § 31(4). 1910 N.Y. Laws 1783 repealted,
Law of June 25, 1971, ch. 893, § 2, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2164.
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and increased delays caused by jury trials with the fundamental function that
the jury serves in our criminal justice system. 23 Proponents of bench trials
argue that the time required by jury trials causes excessive delays and undue
depletion of the criminal court's limited resources. 24 The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York studied the criminal court system in New York
City and concluded that bench trials can be completed in a few hours, but
that jury trials take at least several days. 25
An enormous number of criminal cases are handled by the courts in densely
populated urban areas such as New York City. In 1978, for example, of the
229,525 criminal arrests in New York City,26 "about 80,000 cases were
'disposed of' in the Criminal Court in Manhattan" alone. 27 Massive caseloads
and the realities of limited resources 28 have caused many observers to believe
that only through compromise can the criminal justice system achieve the
most effective administration. 29 Because the system cannot provide a jury
trial for every defendant, they believe that bench trials are the provident
alternative. 30
To require jury trials despite the inability of the system to supply them,
places undue pressure on prosecutors, who are obligated to provide speedy
trials, 3 1 to accept plea bargaining when confronted with a demand for a jury
trial.32 Judge Irving Lang of the Criminal Court has argued that the accep-
23. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
24. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Final Report and Recommendations
of the Special Committee on Criminal Justice (May, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Bar]; Lang, Not all Misdemeanors Warrant Jury Trials, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1979, at 2, col. 3;
Morgenthau, Morgenthau Backs Governor on Jury-Trial Curb, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1979, at 1,
col. 2. See also Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386
(1954); Harley, Where The Jury Trial Fails, 55 Jud. 94 (1971); Sebille, Trial by Jury: 4n
Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A. J. 53 (1924).
25. Report of the Bar, supra note 24, at 13.
26. Id. at 1.
27. Morgenthau, supra note 24, at 1, col. 4.
28. Although the number of criminal cases that must be dealt with by the criminal courts has
been constantly growing, the resources made available to the criminal courts have decreased. For
example, "[iln 1970, there were eighty-seven judges sitting in [New York] Criminal Court; today
there are seventy-five." Morgenthau, supra note 24, at 2, col. 3.
29. Report of the Bar, supra note 24, at 1; see Lang, supra note 24, at 1, col. 2-4, 2, col. 3-4.
30. Lang, supra note 24, at 2, col. 3-5; Morgenthau, supra note 24 at 1, col. 2-4, 2, col. 3-4;
Report of the Bar, supra note 24, at 1. Nevertheless, despite the large number of criminal cases
handled by the New York City Criminal Courts, there are few trials, bench or jury. In 1977, for
instance, there were only 49 jury trials and 101 bench trials in New York County. Lang, supra
note 24, at 2, col. 5. Moreover, although 113,118 cases in New York City Criminal Court in 1977
resulted in an acquittal or conviction after trial or a guilty plea, there were only 893 trials, bench
or jury. Office of Court Administration-New York City Courts, Criminal Court of the City of
New York Filings, Dispositions and Sentences by Charge Citywide Totals January - June 1977 at
99 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Court Statistics January - June 19771; Office of Court
Administration-New York City Courts, Criminal Court of the City of New York Filings,
Dispositions and Sentences by Charge Citywide Totals July - December 1977 at 99 (May 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Court Statistics July - December 1977].
31. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law, §§ 30.10 (McKinney 1971), 30.20, 30.30 (McKinney Supp.
1979-1980).
32. Lang, supra note 24, at 2, col. 3. In 1977, for example, there were 60,202 guilty pleas to
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tance of a lesser plea by the district attorney should be governed by the
particular circumstances of the case rather than the incapacity of the court
system to provide a jury trial. 33 Moreover, Robert Morganthau, the District
Attorney of New York County, suggests that the excessive amount of plea
bargaining has a deleterious effect on the criminal justice system because the
number of trials in general, by jury or judge, declines. 34 Trials are preferred
in our criminal justice system because plea bargains are made in private,
thereby shielding the participants from public accountability. 3 ; Also, anticipa-
tion of the vigorous scrutiny imposed during a trial encourages conscientious
police work. Without such scrutiny, abuses are more likely to occur. 36 In
sum, Morganthau concludes that, "[i]f the choice for the people in [New York
City] were between having jury trials and having trials before judges without
juries, I would ... urge the former. But that is not the choice. The choice is
between trials before judges and virtually no trials at all.""a7
Nevertheless, opponents of any increase in the use of summary disposition
argue that the functions of the jury trial make it essential to the just resolution
of a criminal case. 38 The jury's most prominent functions are: (1) to prevent
governmental oppression by acting as a buffer between the accused and the
state;39 (2) to insulate the defendant from an "eccentric or biased" judge, or an
misdemeanor charges, but only 660 trials of misdemeanor cases in New York City. Court
Statistics January - June 1977, supra note 30, at 99; Court Statistics July - December 1V77, supra
note 30, at 99.
33. Lang, supra note 24, at 2, col. 3. Factors that should control the prosecutor's sentence
bargaining decision are: (1) the nature of the crime, (2) the defendant's record, and (3) his place in
the community. Id. See generally J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas, 252-69 (1975);
Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 515 t1975);
Wheatley, Plea Bargaining- Case for its Continuance, 59 Mass. L.Q. 31 (1974); Note,
Criminal Law: Plea Bargaining--Legititnizing the Agreement Process, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 487
(1974).
34. Morganthau, supra note 24, at 2, col. 3-4.
35. Id.
36. "Trials test everyone; without them people have a tendency to become sloppy. Young
prosecutors and Legal Aid lawyers cannot learn their trade in relatively simple cases. Police
officers feel less need to investigate and write careful reports. Judges are rarely called upon to
decide issues of law." Id.
37. Id. at 2, col. 4; see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
38. McQuillan, A Judge's Reply to Curb on Jury Trials, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1979, at 1, col. 4;
see Janata, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials, 11 Forum 590 (1976); Karcher, The Case for the
Jury System, 45 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 157 (1968).
39. Prevention of oppression is the longest recognized, and perhaps the most important,
function of the jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). As Blackstone observed in
the 18th century, "our law has therefore wisely placed this ...barrier, of .. a trial by jury,
between the liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for
preserving the admirable balance of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in
the prince: and yet this power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if
exerted without check or control, by justices . . . occasionally named by the crown; who might
then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the
government, by an instant declaration, that such is their will and pleasure." 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *349. An examination of history reveals that when the jury system fails or is
abolished, criminal prosecution becomes an effective mechanism for those in political power to
eliminate opposition. See, e.g., P. Devlin, supra note 14, at 164. An extreme illustration of the
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"overzealous or corrupt" prosecutor; 40 (3) to provide for resolution of factual
issues by group deliberation rather than by the decision of a single judge;4 1 (4)
to dispense with a relevant rule of law that either does not fit the case or is too
harsh under the particular circumstances; 42 and (5) to allow popular participa-
danger that potentially exists is the situation in Iran following the overthrow of tile Shall.
Hundreds of persons who opposed the Ayatollah Khomeini's government have been summarily
tried and executed. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1979, § A at 1, col. 4; id., March 8, 1979, § A at 1, col.
2; id., March 15, 1979, § A at 1, col. 1. Conversely, a pertinent example of how the jury system,
when intact, can protect the criminal defendant against governmental oppression occurred In this
country in the early years of the labor movement. The prosecution of labor leaders by the
government was stifled by the refusal of juries to reach guilty verdicts under the conspiracy laws.
See generally M. Turner, The Early American Labor Conspiracy Cases (1967); Attorney for the
Damned 267-326 (A. Weinberg ed. 1957).
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan argued that the need for the jury to prevent oppression by the
state no longer exists in this country because our laws are enacted and administered through the
democratic process. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 Mich. L. Rev. 302, 305 (1914).
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975). In the United States today, judges and prosecutors are either elected by the people
directly or appointed by elected officials. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Consequently, high standards of integrity and performance are the rule and not
the exception. Broeder, supra note 24, at 420; Haines, General Observations on The Effects of
Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 I11. L. Rev. 96
(1922). Because of the frailty of human nature, however, it may be necessary, on occasion, for a
jury to shield a criminal defendant from an infirmity of either judge or prosecutor. In fact, a
nationwide empirical study of trial by jury revealed that, based on a sample of 3,376 trials,
judges convict defendants in 16% more cases than do juries. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The
American Jury 58-59 (1966).
41. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99-106 (1895); Broeder, supra note 24, at
389. Clinical psychological research has indicated that the group decision making process
characteristic of jury deliberation is a method of reaching factual conclusions that is superior to
the resolution of factual issues by a single person. As opposed to a single judge who makes
decisions in the isolation of whatever biases, eccentricities and assumptions he may have, the jury
reaches a verdict by engaging in open discussion that is bound to expose any personal misconcep-
tions or prejudices. R. Simon, The Jury System in America 146-47 (1975); see Barlund, A
Comparative Study of Individual, Majority and Group Judgment, 58 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psych.
55 (1959); Taylor & Faust, Twenty Questions: Efficiency in Problem Solving As a Function of
Size of Group, 44 J. Exp. Psych. 360 (1952); Winick, The Psychology of the Courtroom, In
Psychology of Crime and Criminal Justice 68 (H. Toch ed. 1979).
42. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Broeder,
supra note 24, at 411; Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 150, 157 (1952);
Kadish & Kadish, The Institutionalization of Conflict-Jury Acquittals, in Law, Justice, and the
Individual in Society 308 (J. Tapp & F. Levine ed. 1977). For a discussion of the jury's role In
tort cases that can be analogized to criminal cases, see Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and
Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1285-86, 1290 (1052). Although a jury theoretically does
not have the legal right to disregard the law, and should be so instructed, the jury undeniably has
the power to do so. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. 187 & nn.30 & 31 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Of course, the jury's power to dispense with the relevant rule of law can be a
double-edged sword. Not only is it possible for a legally guilty but morally innocent defendant to
be set free, but also, local prejudice of the jury can result in the conviction of innocent persons.
For example, southern juries had a propensity to free whites accused of lynching black persons.
Broeder, supra note 24, at 412.
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tion in the judicial process that fosters community responsibility and public
confidence in the judicial process. 43 Therefore, the opponents argue, the jury's
role is too vital to the criminal justice process to be sacrificed for the sake of
economic considerations or judicial expediency."4 Recognizing that the
backlog in criminal courts must be alleviated, they conclude that it can be
accomplished through other, less harmful, means.
4 1
Until 1968, it was solely within the province of state governments to decide
whether to increase the use of summary disposition in the administration of
penal statutes.46 This prerogative was limited, however, in Duncan v. Lou isi-
ana,47 in which the Supreme Court held that a state's policy considerations
are subject to constitutional restraint. Accordingly, any decision to deny a
jury trial to persons accused of a particular offense is subject to certain
constitutional requirements regardless of the policy considerations of economy
and congestion.
4 8
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF THE PETTY OFFENSE ExCEPTION
The United States Constitution can be read as a guarantee that all criminal
defendants have the right to trial by jury.49 That guarantee, however, has
43. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It has always
been part of the political philosophy of this country to maximize popular participation in
governmental processes. Note, The Changing Role of the Jur, in the Nineteenth Century, 74 Yale
L.J. 170, 172 (1964). By acquainting the average citizen with the judicial process, jury duty can
foster a citizen's sense of community interest and responsibility. Broeder, supra note 24, at 417.
Moreover, it has been suggested that one explanation for the high degree of public confidence
enjoyed by the judicial process, compared with other branches of government, stems from the
integral role played by the public when they serve as jurors. Janata, supra note 38, at 598.
44. McQuillan, supra note 38, at 4, col. 6; see Janata, supra note 38; Karcher, supra note 38.
But see Broeder, supra note 24; Harley, supra note 24.
45. Judge McQuillan suggests that "[diedication, hard work, planning and resources are the
means for dealing effectively and rationally with calendar delays." McQuillan, supra note 38. at 4.
col. 6. Additional resources might best be allocated to the New York City Criminal Court for the
appointment of more judges, the hiring of additional administrative and clerical personnel, and
the renovation of the physical plant. In his plan to reduce the current delays in New York's civil
courts, Chief Judge Lawrence Cooke recognized that "[t]he processing of criminal cases presents a
brighter, yet still not satisfactory, picture." Text of Chief Judge's Plan, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1979,
at 2, col. 4. Judge Cooke's plan is not meant to conflict with efforts to reduce delays in the
criminal courts. Id.
46. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U 5. 22,
31 (1879).
47. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
48. The right to trial by jury was the last right enumerated in the sixth amendment to be held
applicable to the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process to obtain witnesses in defendant's favor); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(confrontation with opposing witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial).
49. The Constitution provides that "[tihe trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury, and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The sixth amendment provides that "[iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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always been subject to certain limitations. For example, the Supreme Court
declined to apply the jury trial guarantee to the states until 1968, when it
determined that the jury trial right was incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.50 All states adopted jury trial guarantees
in their own constitutions,5 1 but the definition of the parameters of those
rights had been purely a matter of state law. 5 2
One of the most significant limitations on the jury trial right is the petty
offense exception, used by the Supreme Court to limit the constitutional
guarantee of a jury trial to "serious" crimes. 53 In America, the petty offense
exception has existed since colonial times when judges and magistrates were
permitted to try petty crimes summarily.5 4 By 1789, the procedure had been
firmly established, 5s and because the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitu-
tion "in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were
familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution, ' 56 it incorporated the
petty offense doctrine as an exception to the sixth amendment guarantee.
57
50. In cases prior to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court refused to
incorporate the right to trial by jury into the fourteenth amendment. See Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy prohibition of fifth amendment held not applicable to
states); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934, (felony defendant not entitled under
fourteenth amendment to attend jury's view of crime scene); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900) (no provision of the Bill of Rights is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment).
51. The constitutions of the original 13 states and of every state later admitted to the United
States contained some form of a jury trial right. No state ever dispensed with that right, Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U S. 145, 153-54 (1968), which exists in every state constitution. Ala. Const.
art. I, § 11; Alaska Const. art. I, § 11; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23; Ark. Const. art. II, § 7; Cal.
Const. art. I, § 7; Colo. Const. art. I, § 23; Conn. Const, art. I, § 19; Del. Const. art. I, § 7; Fla.
Const. art. I, § 16; Ga. Const. art. I, § 1; Hawaii Const. art. I, § 11; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 7; II.
Const. art. I, § 8; Ind. Const. art. I, § 13; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10;
Ky. Const. Bill of Rights, § 7; La. Const. art. I, § 17; Me. Const. art. I, § 6; Md. Const.
Declaration of Rights art. 21; Mass. Const. art. XII, § 13; Mich. Const. art. I, § 14; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 6; Miss. Const. art. III, § 26; Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(a); Mont. Const. art. III, § 16; Neb.
Const. art. I, §§ 6, 11; Nev. Const. art. I, § 3; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 15; N.J. Const. art. I, 9;
N.M. Const. art. II, § 12; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2; N.C. Const. art. I, § 24; N.D. Const. art. I, §
7; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10; Okla. Const. art. II, § 19; Or. Const. art. I, § 11; Pa. Const. art. I, §
6; R.I. Const. art. I, §§ 10, 15; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14; S.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 6-7; Tenn. Const.
art. I, § 6; Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; Utah Const. art. I, § 10; Vt. Const. ch. 1, art. 10; Va. Const.
art. I, § 8; Wash. Const. art. I, § 21; W. Va. Const. art. III, §§ 13-14; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7;
Wyo. Const. art. I, § 9.
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968); see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900). State courts had often upheld convictions for three months or more over objections to the
denial of a jury trial. See, e.g., Bray v. State, 140 Ala. 172, 37 So. 250 (1904); State v. Parker, 87
Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924); State v. Anderson, 165 Minn. 150, 206 N.W. 51 (1925).
53. See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621
(1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
54. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
55. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 936.
56. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark.,
169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)); see Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925); Moore v. United
States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875).
57. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621,
623-24 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552-55 (1888).
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Once the Court adopted the petty offense exception the class of offenses
that would be subject to that exception remained to be defined. Such an
endeavor inevitably required that a fine line be drawn through the broad
range of human conduct regulated by criminal law. 58 As a result, the Court
has vacillated in its effort to establish the analytic framework needed to define
the petty offense class, and has set forth four types of crimes that are serious:
crimes that were indictable at common law, crimes that involve moral
turpitude, crimes that are mala in se, and crimes for which the maximum
penalty exceeds six months in prison.
The earliest distinction between petty and serious offenses focused solely
upon the nature of the crime, 59 and the Court examined the colonial common
law as a guide. 60 Colonial treatment of petty offenses was not a mechanical
classification of particular offenses. 6 ' Rather, colonial decisions were the
result of careful analysis that in large measure reflected the public opinion
that the quality and consequences of the crime were serious enough to
warrant a jury trial. 62
Accordingly, in Callan v. Wilson, 6 3 the Court's analysis addressed the
inherent nature of the defendant's criminal conduct.6 4 A thorough examina-
tion of common law authority indicated that conspiracy constituted a crime of
grave and serious character that could not be classified as petty.65 In making
this determination, the Court recognized that an important indicator of the
serious nature of conspiracy was that it was indictable at common law. 6 6
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
59. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-56
(1888).
60. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 67-71 (1904). Eventually the Court adopted a survey of the colonial
treatment of petty offenses written by Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Corcoran. Frankfurter &
Corcoran, supra note 15; see, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 & n.5 (1970); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 n.31 (1968). But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 245 (1959).
61. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 934-65.
62. See id.
63. 127 U.S. 540 (1888). Callan was convicted in the police court of the District of Columbia
for conspiring, through an illegal boycott, to injure several other members of a musical
association to which he belonged. He argued that the police court's denial of his demand for a
jury trial and his subsequent summary trial by that court violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment and the right to trial by jury in criminal cases secured by the Constitution in
Art. III, § 2 and the sixth amendment. 127 U.S. at 547. Shortly after Callan, in Natal v.
Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891), the Court held for the first time that a particular offense was
petty in nature. Natal violated a municipal ordinance that prohibited keeping a private market
within six blocks of any public market in the city. The Court held that a breach of a municipal
ordinance is a petty offense that may constitutionally be tried summarily by a magistrate. Id. at
624.
64. 127 U.S. at 555-57.
65. Id. The Court observed that, historically, society views a crime that involves the
concerted action of two or more people as more serious than the same crime performed by one
individual. Id. at 555-56.
66. Id. at 555. The Court has often considered whether an offense was indictable at common
law to determine whether its nature is serious. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,
625 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). See also Cheff v. Schnakenberg,
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The Court set forth a second criterion for defining the nature of an offense
in Schick v. United States. 67 In Schick, a retail butter dealer was convicted of
buying oleomargarine that had not been stamped in compliance with the
Oleomargarine Act of 1886.68 In holding that this crime was a petty offense
that did not require trial by jury, the Court decided that this crime was "not
one necessarily involving any moral delinquency. " 69 By looking at the level of
moral offensiveness of the crime as an indicator of its seriousness, the Court's
analysis was consistent with the colonial policy, documented by Frankfurter
and Corcoran, to dispose of crimes summarily that "did not offend too deeply
the moral purposes of the community. '70
A third indicator of a crime's nature was provided by the Court in District
of Columbia v. Colts.7 ' After the Court stated that reckless driving of an
automobile so as to endanger property and individuals was a crime indictable
at common law and was so morally offensive as "to shock the general moral
sense," 72 it found that the character of the crime was malum in se and not
merely malum prohibitum, and therefore, inherently evil at common law.
71
Thus, by its nature, reckless driving was a serious offense and not within the
petty class.7 4
Since Colts, the Court has not set any additional criteria to determine the
nature of a petty offense. Rather, the Court has emphasized that the severity
of the penalty authorized for a crime can be determinative of the requirement
for a jury trial. 75 Although it has stated that the nature of the offense is
relevant to the inquiry, the Court also decided that the penalty alone was
384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). At common law, certain crimes, such as
larceny, robbery and burglary, could only be prosecuted upon a formal indictment of the
defendant. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 1004-08 (Chase ed. 1878). Moreover, the
Constitution requires that all infamous crimes be prosecuted by indictment. U.S. Const. amend.
V. See also United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922) (wilfully neglecting to support minor
child); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) (forgery of government securities). Today, however,
courts seldom determine the nature of crimes based on whether they were indictable at
common law. Typically, states require that felonies must be prosecuted by indictment, See, e.g.,
Corr v. Clavin, 96 Misc. 2d 185, 409 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Simonson v. Cahn, 33
A.D.2d 790, 307 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 313 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1970); Cal. Penal Code § 682 (West 1972).
67. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
68. Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, § 11, 24 Stat. 209 (1886). The act prohibited
purchasing, or receiving for sale, oleomargarine that had not been legally stamped by the Internal
Revenue Service for the purpose of levying an excise tax. Id.; see McCray v. United States, 195
U.S. 27 (1904) (constitutionality of Oleomargarine Act of 1886 upheld).
69. 195 U.S. at 67.
70. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 981.
71. 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
72. Id. at 73. The Court discussed the potential danger of automobiles when not driven
carefully. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 74.
75. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (19701; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145




sufficiently serious to warrant a jury trial no matter how petty in nature the
crime.76
The penalty prescribed for a crime has long been recognized as an impor-
tant indicator of a crime's status as petty or serious.7 7 This reasoning is
historically rooted in another colonial practice, discussed by Frankfurter and
Corcoran, of dealing summarily with crimes that were punishable with
relatively light penalties.
78
In order to assess whether a particular penalty by itself is sufficiently harsh
to require trial by jury, the Court developed objective standards based upon
"the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and
ethical judgments. '79 The Court looked at both contemporary penal sanctions
and the common law that prevailed when the Constitution was adopted to
establish a current rule that any crime that carries a maximum prison term of
more than six months is serious. s0 The Court reasoned that at common law
the summary punishment of petty offenses by imprisonment for up to six
months was not uncommon, 8 ' and that the current practice in the federal
court system is to limit the penalty for petty offenses to a six-month prison
term and a $500 fine.8 2 Moreover, as recently as 1970, in Baldwin v. New
York, s 3 the Court observed that states other than New York uniformly refuse
to deny the right to a jury trial when the penalty for a crime exceeds six
months. 84
One of the first cases to emphasize the nature of the prescribed penalty in
applying the petty offense exception was Cheff v. Schnackenberg. Cheff was
convicted of criminal contempt for falling to comply with a cease and desist
order issued by the Federal Trade Commission. 6 The Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, concluding that Cheff was not entitled to a jury trial
when charged with criminal contempt for two reasons. The crime was
deemed petty in nature, and Cheff's sentence was six months imprisonment.
76. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1974); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 72-73 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968). In District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (19371, the Court analyzed the nature of the punishment in order to hold
that the right to a jury trial did not attach, but only after it determined that the "offense of which
the petitioner was convicted [was], by its nature," petty. Id. at 624-25. The Supreme Court has
never held, however, that a crime that is serious in nature can be classified as petty if it does not
carry a serious punishment.
77. E.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904).
78. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 15, at 934-65.
79. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937).
80. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70-74 (1970); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
373, 379-80 (1966). See also Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1974). For a
detailed discussion of the six-month rule that existed at common law, see Frankfurter &
Corcoran, supra note 15, at 939-40, 947, 950, 952-53, 959-60.
81. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1937).
82. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70-71 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
161 (1968); see Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 375 (1966); 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
83. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
84. Id. at 72-74.
85. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
86. Id. at 375.
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If the sentence were for a term of more than six months, however, Cheff
would have had an absolute right to a jury trial, notwithstanding the petty
nature of criminal contempt.8 7
In contempt cases, the Court has uniformly continued the six-month rule. 88
In the recent case of Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,9 the six-month limitation
was characterized as "a fixed dividing line between petty and serious of-
fenses." 90 Although Justice White implied that a prison term of less than six
months is sufficient by itself to place a crime in the petty class even if the
nature of the offense is otherwise serious, he noted that such a characteriza-
tion was not necessarily the opinion of the Court. He conceded that "at the
very least, the sixth amendment requires a jury trial in all criminal prosecu-
tions where the term of imprisonment authorized by statute exceeds six
months." 91
Justice White's concession in Codispoti was based upon the two non-
contempt cases in which the Supreme Court applied the six-month rule to
determine the applicability of the petty offense exception. The first of these
cases was Duncan v. Louisiana,92 in which the Court held "that a crime
punishable by two years in prison is . . . a serious crime and not a petty
offense. "93
The Duncan Court reached this conclusion after it made a detailed exam-
ination of the history of the jury trial in criminal cases. Citing Cheff, the
Court determined that "[cjrimes carrying possible penalties up to six months
do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses. ",94 The
Court did not ignore the importance of the nature of the offense to the
application of the petty offense doctrine. - It merely stated that the nature of
the offense as serious or petty was not relevant in Duncan when the penalty
attached to the crime was a possible two year prison sentence. 96
Although the Duncan Court cited the six-month limitation prescribed in
federal contempt cases, it did not set that limit for the states' criminal justice
systems. 97 That question first arose in Baldwin v. New York9" after the New
York Court of Appeals determined that the state's traditional view of the
serious-petty distinction was the same as its felony-misdemeanor distinction,
even though the maximum punishment for misdemeanors was one year. 99
At issue in Baldwin was section 40 of the New York City Criminal Court
Act which then prohibited jury trials in New York" City criminal courts when
87. Id. at 380.
88. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147, 149-52 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195-97 (1968).
89. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
90. Id. at 512.
91. Id. at 512 n.4.
92. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
93. Id. at 162.
94. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 159-60.
96. Id. at 161-62.
97. Id.
98. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
99. Id. at 69-70.
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the defendant was charged with a crime carrying a penalty of one year in
prison or less. 100 New York defended this statute on the grounds that its
purpose was to increase efficiency and reduce costs in the New York City
criminal court system.'
The New York Court of Appeals interpreted Duncan as permitting a
determination that all misdemeanors are petty in nature if the punishment for
those crimes does not exceed two years. It concluded that for offenses
punishable by less than two years in prison, the Duncan Court left to the
lower courts the task of determining whether a crime should be "charac-
terized" as petty or serious.' 0 2 The Supreme Court reversed, however, and
held that any crime with an authorized punishment in excess of six months
cannot be petty.
0 3
100. The New York City Criminal Court Act provided that: "All trials in the court shall be
held before a single judge; provided, however, that where defendant has been charged with a
misdemeanor... [tlhe defendant shall be advised that he has the right to a trial in a part of the
court held by a panel of three of the judges thereof. . . ." Law of April 27, 1967, ch. 680, § 132,
1967 N.Y. Laws 1578-79, repealed, Law of June 25, 1971, ch. 893, § 2, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2164.
For the current version of this statute see note 6 supra. All misdemeanors committed in the city of
New York, except libel, are to be tried in the New York City Criminal Court. N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Act. § 31 (McKinney 1963). The penalty for misdemeanors in New York State may not exceed
one year. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15 (McKinney 1975).
101. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
102. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 213-14, 247 N.E.2d 260, 263, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424,
428 (1969), rev'd sub nom. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Baldwin, who was charged
with "jostling", N.Y. Penal Law § 165.25 (McKinney 1975), relied on the recent Duncan decision
to argue that § 40 was unconstitutional. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d at 212, 247 N.E.2d at
262, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
103. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). The Court expressly did not reach the
petitioner's contention that § 40 also violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment Petitioner challenged § 40 on these grounds because it only applied to criminal trials
in New York City and persons accused of the same crimes outside New York City were entitled to
jury trials by virtue of another statute. Id. at 71 n.17; see Uniform Dist. CL Act, ch. 274, § 243,
1939 N.Y. Laws 635, repealed, Law of July 2, 1971, ch. 1097, § 115, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2756;
Uniform City Ct. Act, ch. 497, § 2011, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1444, repealed, Law of July 2, 1971, ch.
1097, § 105, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2755 (requirement of six person jury trials for all criminal cases
tried outside New York City). Although the statutes challenged in Baldwin have been repealed,
New York retained the geographic distinction between criminal trials in New York City and the
rest of the state. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 340.40(2) (McKinney 1971).
If the Baldwin Court had reached the petitioner's equal protection argument, however, it might
have found the New York law violative of the equal protection clause. The Court's interpretation
of the equal protection clause has been subject to considerable revision. In Salsburg v. Maryland,
346 U.S. 545 (1954), for example, the Court upheld a Maryland statute that permitted illegally
obtained evidence to be admissible only in the prosecution of gambling misdemeanors committed
in one particular county of the state. The Court reasoned that Maryland's efforts to deal with the
high level of illegal gambling in that single county provided a rational basis for the statute, and
that such a geographic distinction was within the wide discretion afforded a state in prescribing
rules of practice. Id. at 549-50. The Court upheld a Missouri rule of appellate procedure in
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879) which allowed direct appeals of criminal convictions to the
Supreme Court of Missouri from every circuit court of the state except from those in five specific
counties. Although the case did not involve the right to trial by jury, the Court employed the
sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury to illustrate its reasoning when it stated that "there is
nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it
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The Court also questioned the New York analog5, between the serious-petty
and felony-misdemeanor distinctions. It refused to accept that analogy be-
cause "some misdemeanors are also 'serious' offenses.' 10 4 As in Duncan, the
Court recognized that the nature of the offense is an important consideration
when defining a petty offense, 10 5 but it also determined that the penalty
authorized was, by itself, sufficient to impose the right to a jury trial.106
The Baldwin Court also chose to clarify the Duncan rule by setting a
maximum six-month limit on the sentence that can be authorized for an
otherwise petty offense without allowing a jury trial. This maximum was
expressly defined as applicable only if the nature of the crime is such that the
severity of the penalty alone is the object of the serious-petty inquiry. 10 7
Only when the distinction between application of the petty offense excep-
tion to penalties severe by themselves and to crimes without such penalties is
recognized, can the Supreme Court decisions be reconciled. The fixed dividing
line referred to by Justice White in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania'0 8 can only be
applied when the nature of the offense is petty, such as in cases of criminal
contempt. 109
sees fit for all or any part of its territory. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to
secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies.
Great diversities in these respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line. On
one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right." 101
U.S. 22, 31 (1879). As Judge Burke noted in his dissent to Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207,
247 N.E.2d 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1969), rev'd sub nona. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970), however, Salsburg and Lewis probably would not be controlling precedent because of
some of the Court's more recent decisions in the equal protection area. Id. at 230-32, 247
N.E.2d at 273-74, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 442-44 (Burke, J., dissenting). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S
186 (1962), for example, the Court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint that alleged
that Tennessee's apportionment statute violated the equal protection clause. The Court held that
the right to vote was fundamental and thus protected by the equal protection clause against
dilution by an arbitrary and capricious state apportionment plan. Id. at 230-37. In another state
apportionment case, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 11964), the Court held that the "Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis," Id. at 568, and that Alabama's apportionment plan
constituted invidious discrimination which impaired the fundamental right to vote. Id. at 568-71.
Finally, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the right to trial by jury in serious criminal
cases was held to be fundamental. Id. at 153-55. A state, therefore, cannot arbitrarily
impair the jury trial right, and the Court probably would not sustain a state statute that
geographically discriminated against that right. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y. 2d 207, 230-32, 247
N.E.2d 260, 273-74, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 442-43 (1969) (Burke, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nora.
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
104. 399 U.S. at 70.
105. Id. at 69-70. "Decisions of this Court have looked to both the nature of the offense Itself,
as well as the maximum potential sentence, in determining whether a particular offense was so
serious as to require a jury trial." Id. at 69 n.6 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 73-74.
107. "This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us with the only objective criterion
by which a line could ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty alone-between
offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." Id. at 72-73
(emphasis added).
108. 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974).
109. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1966); District of Columbia v.
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Therefore, before the New York legislature can constitutionally deny jury
trials by removing serious penalties, it must be sure that the misdemeanors in
question are petty in nature. 110 An examination of the crimes selected for
reclassification, however, indicates that although the proposed legislation is
an attempt to alleviate the burden on the New York City courts, these four
misdemeanors are by their nature serious crimes.1"'
111. APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Notwithstanding the proposal to create a new class of misdemeanors, petit
larceny, theft of services, possession of stolen property, and criminal mischief
are serious crimes. Application of the analysis developed by the Supreme
Court in the petty offense area indicates that it is unconstitutional to deny the
right to trial by jury to persons accused of these crimes that are both mala in
se and morally offensive in nature.
A. Moral Offensiveness
Although the morals of our society constantly change and are sometimes
difficult to assess,'1 2 courts must often determine whether a crime involves
moral turpitude. 1 3 It is generally accepted that moral turpitude is present if a
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937); State v. Superior Ct., 121 Ariz. 174, 175-76, 589 P.2d 48,
49-50 (Ct. App. 1978). See also Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Revised Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors
Before United States Magistrates 3 (1979).
110. As Justice Douglas stated in his dissent to Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966),
"an offense the penalty for which is relatively light is not necessarily 'petty'. .. The principal
inquiry, then, relates to the character and gravity of the offense itself. Was it an indictable offense
at common law? It is malum in se or malum prohibitun? What stigma attaches to those convicted
of committing the offense?" Id. at 390 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
111. In 1977, in more than 56 misdemeanor categories, 101,141 cases were filed in New York
City Criminal Court. Of these filings, the four misdemeanors for which the proposed legislation
will require summary disposition amounted to 24,133 cases, or almost 24% of the total
misdemeanor docket. Court Statistics January - June 1977, supra note 30, at 83-84; Court
Statistics July - December 1977, supra note 30, at 83-84. Although the congestion in the criminal
courts might easily be relieved by requiring bench rather than jury trials for the most recurrent
misdemeanors, the determination of whether a constitutional protection of trial by jury should
attach to a crime should not depend on how frequently a crime is prosecuted. In distinguishing
between petty and serious crimes the Supreme Court has never addressed any such factor.
112. As stated by a federal court judge in the context of an alien deportation proceeding:
"While the term 'moral turpitude' has been used in the law for centuries it has never been clearly
or certainly defined. This is undoubtedly because it refers, not to legal standards, but rather to
those changing moral standards of conduct which society has set up for itself through the
centuries." United States v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947); see 4 St. Mary's
L.J. 126, 127-28 (1972).
113. Whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of law for the court to decide.
Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435 P.2d 553, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); see
Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 117 (1929). This question arises in a
variety of legal contexts. A proceeding to disbar an attorney, revoke a physician's license, or
deport an alien may hinge on whether a person acted with moral turpitude. In addition, a prior
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may provide grounds for impeaching a witness'
testimony. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951); see e.g., Costello v. Immigration &
Nat. Serv., 376 U.S. 120 (1964) (alien deported); Williams v. State, 55 Ala. App. 436, 316 So. 2d
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crime ihvolves dishonesty, 114 baseness, vileness, or depravity, or if it involves
conduct contrary to accepted social standards. 11 No definition, however, can
provide a foolproof mechanical method for differentiating crimes that are
morally offensive from those that are not. Rather, the determination is made
by carefully weighing the inherent nature of the criminal transgression against
the mores of society. 116
Petit larceny, theft of services, and possession of stolen property are all
theft-related crimes1 17 that involve moral turpitude. Petit larceny has consis-
tently been characterized as morally offensive.118 Theft of services was not
recognized at common law as larceny because no personal property was
involved, 119 however, legislatures eventually included theft of services as one
of the theft offenses codified in their penal statutes. 120 Similarly, possession of
362 (1975) (testimony impeached); In re Waisbren, 15 Cal. 3d 553, 542 P.2d 639, 125 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1975) (attorney disbarment); In re Keogh, 25 A.D 2d 499, 267 N.Y.S.2d 87, modified on
other grounds, 17 N.Y.2d 479, 214 N.E.2d 163, 266 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1965) (attorney disbarment);
Lee v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 29 Wis. 2d 330, 139 N.W.2d 61 (1966) (dental license
revocation hearing). See generally Wexler & Neet, The Alien Criminal Defendant: An Examina-
tion of Immigration Law Principles For Criminal Law Practice, 10 Crim. Law Bull. 289, 298
(1974).
114. In re Pontarelli, 393 Ill. 310, 315-16, 66 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1946) (draft evasion); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 212, 361 A.2d 862 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 477 Pa.
424, 383 A.2d 1280 (1978) (burglary, larceny and receiving stolen property).
115. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (tax fraud); State v. Adkins, 40 Ohio App. 2d
473, 475, 320 N.E.2d 308, 310-11 (1973) (illegal possession of a firearm).
116. See United States v. Esperdy, 187 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d 341
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 905 (1961); United States. v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D.
Pa. 1947). In Esperdy, the court concluded that a conviction for bribery involved moral
turpitude, and thus, was grounds for the deportation of an alien. Disregarding the circumstances
surrounding the particular conduct of the alien and the state's characterization of the offense, the
court examined the inherent nature of bribery and concluded that it is the act of "corruptly
influencing one in the discharge of his duties, responsibilities, or loyalties, moral and even
contractual." 187 F. Supp. at 756.
117. In the New York Penal Law, all three of these crimes are codified under Title J, which Is
entitled "Offenses Involving Theft." N.Y. Penal Law §§ 155.00-165.65 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1979-1980).
118. See Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.) (petit larceny grounds for deportation
of alien), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980 (1959); Caldwell v. State, 282 Ala. 713, 213 So. 2d 919 (1968)
(petit larceny grounds for impeachment of witness' testimony); In re Henry, 15 Idaho 755, 99 P.
1054 (1909) (petit larceny grounds for disbarment of attorney).
119. See Tillery v. State, 44 Ala. App. 369, 209 So. 2d 432 (1968); -People v. Ashworth, 220
A.D. 498, 501-02, 222 N.Y.S. 24, 28 (4th Dep't 1927); State v. Guffey, 265 N.C. 331, 144
S.E.2d 14 (1965). See generally Sharp v. Erie R.R., 90 A.D. 502, 85 N.Y.S. 553 (3d Dep't
1904), rev'd on other grounds, 184 N.Y. 100, 76 N.E. 973 (1906). Although courts were willing to
include items such as electricity and gas supplied by utilities within the purview of personal
property, see, e.g., People v. Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, 11 N.E.2d 403 (1937); People v. Neiss, 92
Misc. 2d 839, 401 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1978), they were not willing to consider other services
to be personal property for the purposes of larceny prosecution. See, e.g., Chappell v. United
States, 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959); People v. Ashworth, 220 A.D. 498, 222 N.Y.S. 24 (4th Dep't
1927). In other contexts, however, they were willing to consider services to be property. See, e.g.,
In re Ira Haupt & Co , 424 F.2d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (services rendered by attorneys held to be
property for purposes of bankruptcy statute).
120. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1802 (1978); Del Code Ann. tit. 11, § 845 (Supp. 1978);
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stolen property was not included in common law larceny because the defen-
dant does not participate in the actual taking. 12 1 In New York, the elements
of criminal possession of stolen property are included in the definition of
larceny. 122 Therefore, no matter whether a thief steals personal property, the
services of another, or possesses property stolen from another, his conduct is
dishonest and morally offensive.
Although a person who commits criminal mischief invades another's prop-
erty rights, the crime differs from theft-related crimes because he does not
take or withhold for his own benefit. 123 Instead, he intentionally or recklessly
destroys the property of another.' 24 The statutory definition of criminal
mischief embraces various forms of criminal conduct. It ranges from the
vandalization of public property, 125 to the malicious damage of an automo-
bile, 126 and from the malicious killing of another person's animals, t2 7 to the
destruction of gravestones in a cemetery.128 Recently, for example, persons
suspected of burning crosses on the lawns of black residents have been
charged with this crime.
129
Intentional criminal mischief consists of base, vile, and depraved conduct
that violates the social duties man owes to his fellow man and society.130
Although reckless conduct may not be regarded to be as severe as intentional
conduct, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Colts' 3' that to
act "so recklessly 'as to endanger property and individuals' is [to] act [with]
such obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to
shock the general moral sense.' 132 Criminal mischief, therefore, is a crime of
moral turpitude.
The morally offensive character of petit larceny, theft of services, posses-
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3745 (1974); N.Y. Penal Law § 165.15 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1979-1980); see W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, at 634; Hechtman, Practice Commentary,
N.Y. Penal Law § 165.15, at 226 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979-1980).
121. Possession of stolen property has been held to involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., United
States v. Reimer, 17 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (possession of stolen property grounds for
deportation of alien); In re Fistel, 38 A.D.2d 727, 330 N.Y.S.2d 226 (2d Dep't 1972) (possession
of stolen property grounds for disbarment of attorney); Tucker v. Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 434 P.2d
320 (1967) (possession of stolen property grounds for impeachment of witness testimony).
122. Compare N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 (McKinney 1975) (criminal possession of stolen
property) with id. § 155.05(1) (definition of larceny).
123. See People v. Woodward, 38 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (31 Hun.) 57, 2 N.Y. Cr. 32 (1883); Jordan
v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 414, 296 S.W. 585 (1927). See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
976-77 (Chase ed. 1878).
124. See, e.g., People v. Summer, 64 A.D.2d 658, 407 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't 1978); People
v. Delgado, 36 A.D.2d 938, 321 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1st Dep't 1971).
125. In-re Charles W., 72 Misc. 2d 370, 339 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Faro. Ct. 1972).
126. In re Brendan H., 82 Misc. 2d 1077, 372 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Faro. Ct. 1975).
127. In re M-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 272 (1948); People v. Woodward, 38 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (31 Hun.)
57, 2 N.Y. Cr. 32 (1883).
128. People v. McDonald, 8 Misc. 2d 50, 167 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Columbia County Ct. 1957).
129. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1979, § B at 2, col. 1.
130. In re M- , 3 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (1948).
131. 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
132. Id. at 73. For a discussion of the criteria examined by the Court to reach this conclusion,
see notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
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sion of stolen property and criminal mischief does not diminish when those
crimes are limited to property valued at $150 dollars or less. Conduct in
violation of property rights is morally offensive in character irrespective of the
value of the property involved. 133 For example, in Orlando v. Robinson, 134
an alien was deported pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act'"1
because he was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. 136 One
conviction was for the theft of packages that were worth five dollars. 137 Judge
Parkinson concluded, however, that although the minimal value of the
property "might have been a disappointment to the thief . . . it would not
extirpate the element of moral turpitude.1
1 38
That the degree to which an act offends society's moral standards does not
depend on the amount taken or destroyed by the defendant is also evident
after an examination of the social stigma that attaches to a person convicted
of any crime.139 Even if the maximum penalty is lowered to six months, a
conviction of any of the four crimes proposed to be treated as petty offenses
may severely stigmatize the defendant. 140 Indeed, a prison term may prove
far less costly than the possible collateral legal and social consequences
incurred. 141 A doctor or lawyer who is convicted of petit larceny, theft of
133. See Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 16, 22 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 847
(1961); Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980 (1959); Lewis v.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 23 Ga. App. 647, 99 S E. 147 (1919) (medical license revoked
for theft of $3.70); In re Henry, 15 Idaho 755, 99 P. 1054 (1909).
134. 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980 (1959).
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
136. An alien shall be deported who "at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes
involving moral turpitude." Id., § 1251(a)(4).
137. Orlando had also been convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The only
issue before the Seventh Circuit, however, was whether petit larceny was a crime of moral
turpitude. 262 F.2d at 851.
138. Id. "Theft has always been held to involve moral turpitude, regardless of the sentence
imposed or the amount stolen." Soetarto v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th
Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
139. See note 110 supra.
140. As Judge Burke observed in his dissent to Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 247
N.E.2d 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1969), rev'd sub nona. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970),
a conviction for any misdemeanor in New York State seriously impairs a person's opportunity to
obtain employment. No one with a prior conviction of any crime may act as a bail bondsman.
N.Y. Ins. Law § 331(3)(b) (McKinney 1966). A misdemeanor conviction may also preclude a
person from obtaining a professional license, N.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(5) (McKinney Supp.
1979-1980), a private investigator's license, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 74(2) (McKinney 1968), or a
license to carry a firearm. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 ("McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1979-1980).
Finally, such person may be denied employment in the New York Civil Service, N.Y. Civ. Serv.
Law § 50(4)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980), or denied eligibility to serve as a juror. N.Y. Jud.
Law § 509(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties
and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379, 406-10 (1976);
Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 463, 505-16 (1967); Hart, The Aims
of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 402-06, 436-40 (1958); Lasswell & Donnelly,
The Continuing Debate Over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation
Sanction, 68 Yale L.J. 869, 894-98 (1959).
141. Courts have discretion to decide whether these consequences are appropriate and may
decide not to impose sanctions in a specific case. See In re Fischer, 179 F.2d 361, 370 (7th Cir.
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services, possession of stolen property or criminal mischief faces the prospect
of losing his professional license, and thereby, his livelihood. 14 2 An alien
convicted of one of these misdemeanors may be subject to deportation, 4 3 a
penalty akin to banishment or exile. 14 4 Moreover, whenever a person con-
victed of these crimes testifies at civil or criminal proceedings as either a party
or witness, he places his credibility at issue because he was convicted of a
crime of moral turpitude. 14s Accordingly, the punitive consequences incurred
by a person accused of these four misdemeanors are not limited to the
authorized prison term. Although the proposed legislation reduces the maxi-
mum prison term to six months, it does not modify the other serious legal and
social consequences that stigmatize a person convicted of these crimes.
B. Mala in se or Mala prohibita
Not only are petit larceny, theft of services, possession of stolen property,
and criminal mischief considered morally offensive by present day standards,
but they were also classified as inherently evil at common law. They are niala
in se as opposed to ma/a prohibita crimes. Mala in se crimes are wrong in
themselves or inherently evil. Mala prohibita crimes, however, are wrong
only because they are prohibited by statute, not because they are naturally
evil. 1
46
Although several commentators have questioned the utility of the distinc-
tion between mala in se and mala prohibita, 117 it still survives. In fact,
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1951). The Court has clearly indicated that the severity of a
criminal penalty is not judged by the actual penalty imposed but rather by the maximum
potential punishment authorized. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969), Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968). See generally Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 211 (1968).
142. See note 113 supra.
143. See, e.g., Soetarto v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 516 F.2d 778, 779 (7th Cir. 1975) (two
thefts involving property valued at $135 and $100); United States v. Reimer, 17 F, Supp. 414
(S.D.N.Y. 1936) (possession of stolen property); In re M-, 3 1. & N. Dec. 272 (1948) (criminal
mischief).
144. Costello v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964).
145. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 429
(S.D. Ohio 1968) (petit larceny); Caldwell v. State, 282 Ala. 713, 721, 213 So. 2d 919, 926-27
(1968) (petit larceny); Tucker v. Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 5-6, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (1967) (possession of
stolen property); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 212, 216, 361 A.2d 862, 865 (1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 477 Pa. 424, 383 A.2d 1280 (1978) (possession of stolen property). See
generally People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
146. State v. Taylor, 121 N.J. Super. 395, 397, 297 A.2d 216, 217 (Bergen County Ct. 1972);
People v. Treen, 33 Misc. 2d 571, 225 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Herkimer County CL 1962); see W. LaFave
& A. Scott, supra note 12, at 29-30; Note, The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and 31!ala in
Se in Criminal Law, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 74 (1930). Nearly all crimes are codified in penal statutes,
yet Blackstone recognized a distinction when he observed that "some of [these crimes) are mala in
se, or offenses against the divine law, either natural or revealed; but by far the greatest part are
mala prohibita, or such as derive their guilt merely from their prohibition by the laws of the land."
2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *420.
147. See, e.g., Mueller, Mens Rea and the Lau, Without It, 58 W. Va. L. Rev. 34, 58-59
(1955); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 70-71 (1933); Note, The Distinction
Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se in Criminal Law, 30 Coturn. L. Rev. 74 (1930).
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judicial decisions often turn on the application of this distinction. For
example, many jurisdictions recognize the crime of unlawful act manslaugh-
ter. 148 In the states that recognize this crime, a person who causes the death
of another while committing an unlawful act may be prosecuted for man-
slaughter. 149 If the unlawful act is malumn in se, the defendant may be
convicted of manslaughter even though the death was coincidental to the
illegal act.150 On the other hand, if the unlawful act is merely malm
prohibitum in nature, the prosecution must prove that the death was a
foreseeable or natural consequence of the act to obtain a conviction.'
Theft-related crimes have been classified as mala in se since Blackstone
formally documented the category. 152 Unlike a violation of the licensing
provisions for firearms, which is prohibited only by statute, 15 3 stealing is
wrong because it is inherently bad. 154 Theft of services is treated separately
from larceny in the penal code not because the criminal conduct is less
wrongful, but because the common law definition of personal property does
not encompass services. I5 Similarly, it is as wrong to possess stolen property
knowingly as it is to perform the initial theft. 156 Criminal mischief is unlawful
conduct that society would not tolerate even in the absence of statutory
prohibition. 157
148. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 192 (West 1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:31(2)(a) (1974);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-3 (1953).
149. Although this concept is disfavored, it persists in many jurisdictions. W. LaFave & A.
Scott, supra note 12, at 30. Courts also employ the distinction between mala in se crimes and those
that are mala prohibita to determine whether a particular crime requires an element of intent.
Mala in se crimes generally require an element of intent while convictions for mala prohibita
crimes may be based on strict liability, requiring no criminal state of mind. See, e.g., Morissette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259 (1952); Duncan v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 231, 233-34, 158
S.W.2d 396, 397 (1942); Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299, 304 (1875); State v. Smith, 17 Wash.
App. 231, 234, 562 P.2d 659, 661 (1977).
150. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 12, at 30.
151. Id.
152. "[Clrimes and misdemeanors, that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore
styled mala in se, such as murder, theft, and perjury; . . contract no additional turpitude from
being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *54.
153. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1979-1980).
154. See Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980
(1959); United States v. Karnuth, 31 F. Supp. 799 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); In re Henry, 15 Idaho 755,
99 P. 1054 (1909).
155. Theft of services, like other theft crimes, is wrongful conduct whether it is prohibited by
statute or not. See generally Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959); People v.
Ashworth, 220 A.D. 498, 222 N.Y.S. 24 (4th Dep't 1927).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Reimer, 17 F. Supp. 414, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Tucker v.
Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 5, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (1967).
157. New York's definition of Criminal Mischief differs from the crime of malicious mischief
at common law because in New York the crime is not limited to malicious conduct and contains
an element of recklessness. Compare N.Y. Penal Law § 145.00 (McKinney 1975) with W. Clark &
W. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes § 12.42-.43, at 978-82 (7th ed. 1967).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930), that
reckless endangerment of persons and property "is not merely malm prohibitum, but in its very
nature is malum in se." Id. at 73.
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Moreover, mala in se crimes generally contain an element of mens rea. In
order to obtain a conviction for petit larceny, theft of services, possession of
stolen property, or criminal mischief, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a criminal state of mind. Thus,
these four misdemeanors cannot be committed by mere accident or negli-
gence. Rather, the defendant's unlawful taking, possession, or destruction of
the property or services of another must be intentional, 5 " knowing, 59 or
reckless. 160
Accordingly, it is improper to treat these crimes as petty offenses. They are,
by their nature, serious, and the Constitution requires that a right to a jury
trial attach to them no matter what the authorized penalty.
C. The Nature of the Penalty
A review of the nation's current practices with respect to penalties for petty
offenses reveals little change since Baldwin v. New York. 161 The federal
system, for example, still provides that the maximum penalty for petty
offenses is six months in prison and a $500 fine. 162 A majority of the states
either have not defined a precise upper limit on the penalty allowed for petty
offenses 163 or have adopted the six-month/$500 maximum imposed on New
158. Larceny requires an intent to steal, People v. Eldridge, 34 A.D.2d 693, 309 N.Y.S.2d
559 (3d Dep't 1970); N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05 (McKinney 1975), as does theft of services. People
v. Lee, 71 Misc. 2d 239, 336 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Crim Ct. N.Y. 1972); N.Y. Penal Law § 165.15
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979-1980).
159. Stolen property must be possessed knowingly. Mack v. Court of Gen. Sessions, 14
A.D.2d 98, 103, 217 N.Y.S.2d 423, 427 (1st Dep't 1961); N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 (McKinney
1975).
160. A criminal mischief conviction cannot stand without proof that the injury to property
was intentional or reckless. N.Y. Penal Law § 145.00 (McKinney 1975).
161. 399 U.S. 66, 72 n.18.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
163. Eleven states recognize the petty offense exception to the right to a jury trial in criminal
cases without defining the parameters of the petty class. Boyd v. Dade County, 123 So 2d 323,
328-31 (Fla. 1960); State v. Shak, 51 Hawaii 612, 613-16, 466 P.2d 422, 424-25, cert denied, 400
U.S. 930 (1970); People v. Flessner, 48 Ill. 2d 54, 55-56, 268 N.E.2d 376, 377 (1971); Houk v.
Starck, 251 Ky. 276, 276-79, 64 S.W.2d 565, 565-66 (1933); Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles,
368 Mass. 141, 143, 331 N.E.2d 52, 53 (1975); State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn. 173, 176-79, 79
N.W.2d 136, 138-40 (1956); State v. Young, 194 Neb. 544, 545-46, 234 N.W.2d 196, 197-98
(1975); State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406, 407 (1885); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1,9-10, 268 A.2d 1, 5-6
(1970); Hamilton v. Walker, 65 N.M. 470, 471-72, 340 P.2d 407, 408-09 (1959); State v.
Underwood, 244 N.C. 68, 69-71, 92 S.E.2d 461, 462-63 (1956). The Supreme Court of Virginia
has held that the right to trial by jury is limited to the extent that it existed at the time Virginia
adopted its constitution. Fog v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 164, 207 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1974) (right
to jury trial on issue of punishment). The Tennessee Supreme Court has done the same. Grooms
v. State, 221 Tenn. 243, 244-45, 426 S.W.2d 176, 176-77 (1968). Courts in ten other states have
done the same in civil contexts. Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 269-70, 292 So. 2d 651,
652-53 (1974); Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 298-99, 363 A.2d 1, 17 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976); Kilgore v. Life Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 890, 892, 227 S.E.2d
860, 862 (1976); Blue Note, Inc. v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 152, 157, 377 P.2d 373, 376 (1962); In re
Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 204, 542 P.2d 676, 683 (1975); Bielby v. Allender, 330 Mich. 12, 16, 46
N.W.2d 445, 448 (1951); Close v. Isbell Constr. Co., 86 Nev. 524, 529, 471 P.2d 257, 260-61
(1970); Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 693, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316 (1978); Smallwood v.
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York in Baldwin. 164 Moreover, a number of states have elected to extend the
right to trial by jury beyond the minimum constitutional requirements. 165 and
some provide the option of jury trials to all persons accused of any crime.1 66
The Supreme Court has recognized that society's values are subject to
change, and therefore, any determination of the severity of a particular
penalty may not be permanent. 167 No court today is capable of predicting
changes in society's values, and there may come a time when the uniform
practices of the nation will require that a defendant confronted with the
possibility of incarceration, however short the period, be afforded the right to
trial by jury.
CONCLUSION
Trial by jury in criminal cases is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution that the states may not impair by placing serious crimes in the
petty offense class. Accordingly, the New York State legislature cannot by
Swarner, 510 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); State v. Boggess, 147 W. Va. 98, 101,
126 S.E.2d 26, 28-29 (1962). Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming guarantee the
right to trial by jury in their constitutions, see note 51 supra, but have not defined the parameters
of that right.
164. Ten states have excepted petty offenses punishable by imprisonment of six months or
less from the state constitutional guarantee. O'Neill v. Mangum, 103 Ariz. 484, 485-86, 445 P.2d
843, 844-45 (1968); Thomas v. State, 331 A.2d 147, 149 (Del. 1975); City of Monroe v. Wilhite,
255 La. 838, 839-42, 233 So. 2d 535, 536, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970); State v. Roll, 267
Md. 714, 730 n.11, 298 A.2d 867, 877 n.11 (1973); McGowan v. State, 258 So. 2d 801, 802-03
(Miss.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972); State v. Nigro, 471 S.W.2d 933, 934-36 (Mo.), appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 804 (1971); State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751, 754 (N.D. 1970); Common-
wealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 463 n.3, 308 A.2d 90, 93-94 n.3 (1973); City of Seattle v,
Rohrer, 69 Wash. 2d 852, 853-54, 420 P.2d 687, 688 (1966); Layton School v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 359-60, 262 N.W.2d 218, 235 (1978).
165. Arkansas, Ohio and Oklahoma have extended the right beyond the minimum constitu-
tional requirement. Although the Supreme Court indicated in Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621
(1891), that a municipal violation is precisely the type of offense for which the Constitution does
not guarantee a jury trial, Arkansas permits persons charged with municipal violations the right
to a jury trial upon appeal to the circuit court. 44 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 116 (1977). See also note 63
supra. Ohio and Oklahoma require the jury trial for all crimes except when the penalty involved
does not exceed a fine of $100. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.17 (1975); Okla. Const. art. II, § 19.
166. Alaska, California, Colorado and Maine have extended the right to provide jury trials
for all criminal cases. State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925, 937-40 (Alaska 1971) (any person accused
of a crime for which he may be incarcerated is entitled to a jury trial); Cal. Penal Code § 689
(West 1970) (persons accused of any public offense are entitled to a jury trial); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
16-10-109 (1973) (persons charged with a petty offense are entitled to a six person jury If
demanded in writing within ten days of arraignment or entry of plea and if twenty-five dollar fee
is paid); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 165-71 (Me. 1974) (constitutional guarantee of trial by jury
extends without qualification to petty offenses).
167. As Justice Stone stated for the Court in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617
(1937): "[Sjtandards of action and of policy which find expression in the common and statute law
may vary from generation to generation. Such change has led to the abandonment of the lash and
the stocks, and we may assume, for present purposes, that commonly accepted views of the
severity of punishment by imprisonment may become so modified that a penalty once thought to
be mild may come to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury trial, which the Constitution
prescribes, in some cases which were triable without a jury when the Constitution was adopted."
Id. at 627; see Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1904).
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reducing the authorized penalty and property value limitation for petit
larceny, possession of stolen property, theft of services, and criminal mischief
transform those crimes into petty offenses. These reductions cannot obviate
the nature of the crimes as morally offensive and inala in se, or remove the
social stigma that may attach to them upon conviction. If enacted, the
proposed amendments will be an unconstitutional infringement upon our right
to be tried by a jury of our peers.
Robert P. Connolly
